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ABSTRACT
This article examines the impact of CEO duality on firm performance; which attracted much attention, especially in 
emerging economies, yet yielded several inconsistent empirical results. CEO duality exists when the offices of the CEO 
and Chairman are retained by the same person. This study examines the relationship between CEO duality and the 
performance of Pakistani public listed companies by using a sample of five years, from 2007 to 2011. This study tested 
the hypotheses with data obtained from the Karachi Stock Exchange 100 indexed firms, and employed the agency and 
stewardship theory perspectives. However, our empirical results do not show a significant relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance, but CEO qualification and CEO affiliation are positively associated with firm performance. 
The results suggest that CEO duality is a less significant issue in corporate governance than suggested by many previous 
researchers and policy makers. The paper contributes to the literature on corporate governance and firm performance 
by introducing a framework in identifying and analyzing moderating variables that affect the relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance.
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INTRODUCTION
The term “Duality” describes the corporate leadership 
structure where one person holds both the positions of CEO 
and Board Chairman in an organization (Finkelstein & 
D’Aveni 1994; Abdullah 2004; Wang et al. 2014; Arslan et 
al. 2014); and it has become an emerging issue of research 
in the current era following corporate scandals around 
the world (Elsayed 2007; Michael & Anurag 2007; Peng, 
Zhang & Li 2007; Iyengar & Zampelli 2009; Chahine & 
Tohmé 2009; Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel & Bierman 2010). 
Interestingly, ten out of these corporate collapses in early 
2000, eight had the CEO/Chairman duality (Albrecht & 
Albrecht 2004).
 The terminology ‘CEO duality’ in the literature is 
diverse. The dual position (CEO and chairman is the same 
individual) is also referred to as combined CEO/Chairman 
(Finkelstein & D’Aveni 1994; Judge et al. 2003 and 
Lam & Lee 2008), CEO-chair duality (Bhagat & Bolton, 
2008), unitary leadership structure (Brickley et al. 1997), 
joint CEO/chairman (Daily & Dalton 1997), and CEO as 
chairman, among others.
 This paper principally investigates the relationship 
between CEO/Chairman duality and the performance of 
Pakistani public listed companies. The other attributes of 
the CEO have also been taken into consideration and their 
effect on firm performance investigated. As for the U.S.’s 
firms, they have pragmatic dominant board leadership 
structure, as observed in 70% to 80% of them (Rechner & 
Dalton 1991 and Rhoades et al. 2001). Conversely, almost 
90% of London Stock Exchange companies separate these 
two offices (Kang & Zaardkoohi 2005).
 The major contribution of this study is that it provides 
auxiliary empirical evidence lending support to the 
espousal of good corporate governance practices such as 
prescribed by the Cadbury Committee (1992) and related 
guidelines. A further contribution made by this study is 
that it provides fresh evidence from an emerging market, 
Pakistan. Pakistan revamped its corporate governance 
structure in 2002 through the issuance of code of corporate 
governance and a revised code issued in 2012 by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). 
The first code (2002) suggests the separation of CEO and 
Chairman’s offices, but the latest code used the phrase 
“must be separated” for both positions.
 Thus, we intend to address the question of whether the 
separation of the roles of CEO and chairman contributes to 
the corporate performance of public listed companies in 
Pakistan. In doing this, we aim to contribute to the literature 
in two ways. First, by specifically examining CEO duality, 
a setting that has been more frequently analyzed in the 
context of multiple governance prescriptions. Second, by 
offering more topical evidence of potential relevance to 
emerging economies, and to Pakistan in particular.
ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING CEO DUALITY
A unifying theme of the various arguments in support 
of duality is that combining the CEO and Chairman 
positions boosts the board’s effectiveness. Donaldson & 
Davis (1991) argued that the stewardship theory offers 
a complementary perspective, by stating that agents are 
good stewards to organization’s resources. Stewardship 
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theorists advocated that there is no inherent conflict of 
interest between agents and principals because, among 
other reasons, CEOs will not risk their reputation and career 
by pursuing interests that collide with the shareholders. 
The CEO also derives job satisfaction from non-tangible 
enticements such as professional reputation, industry 
recognition, goodwill, career advancement and authority. 
These motivations uphold the alignment of interests and 
ruin management opportunism.
 A related theory is that dual leadership structure 
reduces the cost of information transfer between the 
company’s decision makers. The combined CEO position 
avoids the need for the transfer of information that must 
take place if different individuals hold the two positions. 
Since the information transfer may be costly, untimely, 
or incomplete, having significant information residing in 
dual role may press forward the ability of that individual 
to perform the strategic role.
 The supporters of duality also argue that a combined 
position provides a combined command structure, single 
focal point and reduces the company’s cost in decision 
making. A CEO-Chair can exert greater authority and speed 
in making and implementing strategic decisions for the 
company, creating the image of stability. Thus, decisions 
made by a CEO-Chair on an important issue may be 
clearer, timelier, projecting a clear sense of direction, and 
more consistent than decisions made by a CEO who has to 
negotiate and consult with a board that is led by a separate 
Chair. Moreover, having only an individual occupying 
both the CEO and Chair positions reduces public confusion 
on who is in charge of the company, and clarifies who 
is responsible for the firm’s performance and long term 
sustainability.
ARGUMENTS OPPOSING CEO/CHAIRMAN DUALITY
The agency theorists stated that the separation between 
the roles of the CEO and Chairman (Judge et al. 2003) 
safeguards accountability and blight the board’s ability 
to monitor managerial opportunism because CEO has the 
propensity to control the board (Daily & Dalton 1993; 
Wang et al. 2014). Agency theory supporters argued 
that separation enhances the board’s effectiveness in 
management responsibilities by improving both the 
superiority and the suitability of decision making. A non-
executive board Chairperson may bring fresh knowledge, 
self-determination and insights to the board’s decision-
making process which provides distinctive outlooks that 
enhance the board’s ability in its management duties to 
deliberate and make strategic and fundamental business 
decisions.
 Charan (2005) argues that duality minimizes the risk 
of entrenchment due to the lack of motivation and incentive 
to objectively evaluate and discipline the dual executive; 
which increase the risk of entrenching the CEO-Chair in 
both positions. However, dual positions’ entrenchment, 
in turn, increases the potential for this powerful executive 
to use the corporation to further his own private interests 
instead of furthering common shareholder wellbeing.
 In a company where the chairman of the board is also 
the CEO of the company, the powers will be concentrated 
onto one individual and the possibility for the checking 
and balancing of CEOs’ power are virtually eliminated. In 
such corporation, the board of director may not be able to 
function as an independent body, where that is the purpose 
of the board. Taking the agency theory’s perspective, 
separating the role of CEO and chairman will decrease the 
opportunity for the CEO and inside directors to exercise 
behaviors which are self-motivated and costly to the 
provision of finance (Principal).
 Stewart et al. (1991) has also proposed on the 
necessary separation of CEO and board chairman functions; 
one individual cannot perform both roles effectively as 
both roles have their distinctive domain.
CEO DUALITY IN PAKISTAN
Corporate governance system in Pakistan is possibly 
less evolved than those in Anglo-American countries, 
Germany, or Japan. In the intervening time, emerging 
economies as a whole differ substantially from developed 
countries in terms of their institutional, regulatory and 
legal background (Prowse 1999). Nonetheless, there 
are substantial divergence in corporate governance 
frameworks and practices between Pakistan and most 
developing economies. The development of corporate 
governance mechanisms depends on the social, political, 
cultural and historical characteristics of a country (Prowse 
1999). Pakistan carries the legacy of being nearly two 
hundred years under British colonial rule. This resulted in 
similar administrative style, as far as corporate governance 
is concerned. Besides, it allows Pakistan to inherit an 
English-style institutional and regulatory framework in 
the form of a Companies Act.
 Pakistan is a common law country having one tier 
board structure and the mainstream public companies 
display concentrated ownership pattern with family or/
and holding company ownership. In several instances, 
controlling group controls the firms directly or employs an 
outsider CEO, but the family’s head or elder is exerted as 
Chairman of the Board. Meanwhile, business atmosphere 
in Pakistan is illustrated by the influence of dominant 
controlling shareholders, minority representation and 
management, in favor of the first. In order to improve the 
corporate governance environment in Pakistan, an array 
of institutional and regulator inventiveness have been 
implemented as a result of the monumental corporate 
scandals in USA and UK.
 SECP and State Bank of Pakistan have initiated 
numerous reforms aimed at improving corporate 
governance mechanism in Pakistan. In the midst of these, 
the vital development is the implementation of the code 
of Corporate Governance in Pakistan in 2002; which 
was substantially revised in 2012. Pakistan Institute of 
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Corporate Governance (PICG) was established in 2004, it 
increases awareness and champions the derivation of good 
governance practices, and it develops professionalism 
and encourages engagement of corporate bodies and 
individuals into the role of overseeing efficiency.
LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES
CEO duality is considered as one of the most discussed and 
controversial topics in corporate governance literature 
(Abdullah 2004; Fosberg 2004; Wang et al. 2014), 
which provides persuasive, but competing, predictions 
(Rechner & Dalton 1991). The board is a governance 
mechanism in agency framework, for strategic decision 
making and setting organization vision (Abdullah 2004), 
by the supposition that when the shareholders have the 
information to verify and influence supervision deeds, 
the executives are more likely to act in the interests of 
the shareholders. 
 Moreover, agency theorists put forward one key 
monitoring feature which is the separation between the 
roles of the CEO and chairman (Abdullah 2004; Li & 
Li 2009). According to this view, duality may blight 
the board’s ability to watch for executive opportunism 
(Daily & Dalton 1993) because the powerful chief 
executive is able to control the board. Moreover, agency 
theorist claims that a powerful leader holding both the 
CEO and board chairman positions will tend to pursue his 
personal interests more willingly than for the benefit of 
the principal (Weisbach 1988). An individual with dual 
positions will tend to operate ceremonially, communicate 
poorly and “rubber-stamp” the executive’s verdicts (Chen 
& Young 2009 and Hu et al. 2009).
 On the other hand, the separation of CEO and 
chairman positions sends positive signals to corporate 
lenders and investors. Hence, increases the chances 
of raising additional capital that reduces the risk of 
bankruptcy. Yermack (1996) reported that firms are more 
valuable when the CEO and chairman’s offices are held 
separately. Fosberg (2004) opined that in firms where 
the positions of CEO and chairman are clearly separated, 
the level of debt in their capital structure is most likely 
to be optimally employed. Besides, Ehikioya & Benjami 
(2009) discovered that for firms in which their CEO and 
Board chairman are separated, stakeholders are likely to 
gain confidence in the firms’ ability to raise additional 
capital; and hence, there are less chances of bankruptcy.
 CEOs have higher fiduciary powers, stemming from 
their hierarchical role and relational power, based on 
proficiency and esteem, than the board (Stiles 2001). 
However, both leading positions achieve by same 
persona, not only greater formal authority over board 
members, but also an increased informal influence over 
board processes (Allan & Widman 2000). 
 Accordingly, duality has been disparaged as it 
curtails monitoring (Zajac & Westphal 1994). Thus, 
those who demand for the restructuring of corporate 
governance mechanism stress on the significance of 
attentive monitoring afforded by the absence of duality 
(Lorsch & MacIver 1989 and Stiles 2001). This is 
an interesting argument to those who want these two 
positions split. However, Stiles (2001) disagreed, in view 
of the implication of acquisitions and potential agency 
issues concerned; whereby through the backing of agency 
theory, it is anticipated that the duality will be more likely 
to affect acquisition performance negatively.
 Converse ly,  s t ewardsh ip  theory  o ffe r s  a 
complementary perception; stating that agents are good 
stewards to company resources and can lead to efficient 
company (Donaldson & Davis 1991).
 Gillan (2006) found a positive relationship between 
CEO duality and firm financial performance. Further, 
Faleye (2007) showed that CEO duality is positively 
related to organizational complexity, CEO reputation and 
managerial ownership. This finding is in line with Peng, 
Zhang and Li (2007) and their findings on CEO duality 
strongly support the stewardship theory.
 Proponents of stewardship theory argued that 
stability in leadership structure should have a number of 
advantages, as it allows lucid delineation of leadership and 
control responsibilities; that over time are well understood 
by management, board members, and the investors (Boyd, 
1995; Daily & Dalton 1997). Meanwhile, Finkelstein & 
D’Aveni (1994), Leng (2004), Adams et al. (2005), Gillan 
(2006), Kroll et al. (2008) and Jackling & Johl (2009) 
showed that the shareholders’ benefits are improved by 
combining the roles of chairman and CEO. 
 Stewardship theory yields a contrasting hypothesis 
regarding acquisition performance. If it is true that 
CEO duality results in more consistent strategies’ 
formulation and implementation; and subsequently 
better firm performance, then the effects of acquisition 
announcement should be positive. Hence, from the above 
review of literature, we conjecture that the effect of CEO 
on firm performance is unresolved, which requires an 
investigation on a strong relationship between CEO duality 
and firm performance. Therefore, under the stewardship 
framework, it is hypothesized that:
H1: There is a positive association between CEO duality 
and firm performance.
 There is an increasing body of research which 
shows that there is not a single model that adequately 
portrays corporate governance in all national contexts 
(La Porta et al. 1997 & 1998). Firms in developing 
countries have different institutional expectations than 
in developed countries, and such different institutional 
contexts may lead to a different relationship with firm 
performance (Judge et al. 2003; Abdullah 2004). Due 
to this prospective, developing countries do not endorse 
the appointments of chairman from the CEO of the same 
company in their respective code of corporate governance. 
The UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance states 
that “a chief executive should not go on to be chairman 
of the same company. If exceptionally a board decides 
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that a chief executive should become chairman, the 
board should consult major shareholders in advance and 
should set out its reasons to shareholders at the time of 
the appointment and in the next annual report” (p. 7). 
 The code of corporate governance 2002 in Pakistan 
states that “The Chairman of a listed company shall 
preferably be elected from among the non-executive 
directors of the listed company. The Board of Directors 
shall clearly define the respective roles and responsibilities 
of the Chairman and Chief Executive, whether or not 
these offices are held by separate individuals or the same 
individual.” (Clause ix, p. 3)
 The recent empirical research on CEO duality reveal 
mixed and inconclusive picture both in developing and 
developed countries. While a number of studies supported 
CEO duality, several others concluded otherwise; and an 
additional set of studies (Dalton et al. 1998 and Dahya 
2004) did not reveal significant relationships between 
leadership structure and firm performance. To recap on the 
earlier theoretical discussion, the results provide support 
that duality does not affect firm performance (Dahya et 
al. 1996; Laing & Weir 1999; Dedman 2000; Franks et al. 
2001; Rhoades et al. 2001; Weir et al. 2002; Higgs 2003; 
Leng 2004; Kao & Chen 2004; Xie et al. 2003; Davidson 
et al. 2005 and Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali 2006). 
 Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell (1997) showed that CEO 
duality is not associated with inferior performance; while 
Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996) concluded that there 
are no discernible differences in performance that can 
be attributed to a firm’s leadership structure. There are 
studies which also noticed that the association between 
CEO duality and firm performance is moderated by 
family control factor (Ballinger & Marcel 2010; Elsaid 
& Davidson 2009 and Elsaid, Davidson & Benson 
2009). Nonetheless, although most of the empirical 
researches on the relationship between CEO duality and 
firm performance focused on large corporations (Dalton 
et al. 1998), some recent papers researched on transition 
economies.
 Figure 1 represents the CEO’s influence in the related 
tasks and we can see from this figure that the CEO’s level 
of activity is quite high in all the tasks and it is foreseeable 
that the CEOs in the Pakistani public listed companies 
are involved in most of the firm’s areas. Figure 1 also 
indicates that the CEO’s power has two different tendencies. 
Foremost, there are two tasks in which the CEO’s powers 
are high; fiduciary duties and operational function. This 
is consistent with the fact that these are basic CEO’s tasks. 
In contrast, there are three tasks where the CEO has less 
power; succession plan, policy making and design, and 
implement strategic vision. This is a clear indication of 
the increasing role being played by the board of directors 
in strategic management.
METHODOLOGY
For this study, a sample of 100 companies were taken from 
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) 100 indexed companies from 
2007 to 2011 (five years). Five companies were excluded 
due to non availability of data or missing data. According to 
the Karachi Stock Exchange official brochure “The KSE-100 
Index was introduced in November 1991 with a base value of 
1,000 points. The KSE - 100 Index comprises of 100 selected 
companies on the basis of sector representation and highest 
market capitalization, which capture over 90% of total 
market capitalization of companies listed on the Exchange.” 
 The sample’s selection procedure was based on sectors. 
From the 33 sectors, 32 companies were selected, i.e. one 
company from each sector (excluding Open-End Mutual 
Fund Sector) on the basis of the largest market capitalization 
and the remaining 66 companies were selected on the basis 
of largest market capitalization in descending order; where 
this is based a total return index, i.e. dividend, bonus and 
rights are adjusted.
 Data on obligatory variables was collected through 
secondary sources. Meanwhile, data on corporate governance 
internal mechanism was collected through corporate 
information pages, the code of corporate governance 
FIGURE 1. Comparison on Basic CEO Tasks
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compliance report, directors’ profiles and directors’ report 
to the shareholders. Data related to the financial part of the 
study was collected from financial statement section of 
Annual Reports. Table 1 represents the data set of five years 
on the basis of availability.
 Table 2 illustrates the summary of the dual characteristics 
of the sample; i.e. Dual CEO position and separate CEO 
position. The result indicates that for family firms, 85% 
(402) of them have a separate position for CEO, in contrast 
to 15% (73) in dual CEO position. Interestingly, the average 
year of affiliation with the firm in separate CEO /chair is 9 
years, while the affiliation of CEO with the firm is 12 years 
in the case of duality.
 Particularly, prior research showed that shorter CEO 
decision horizon has a significant agency cost (Antia, 
Pantzalis & Park 2010), and thus, CEO tenure is controlled 
as the impact of firms having long- serving CEOs cannot 
be easily undone, which might arises due to the CEO’s 
lack of discipline which results in firm’s poor performance 
(Berrone & Gomez-Mejia 2009; Lau, Sinnadurai & Wright 
2009). Moreover, 84% (301) of CEOs have postgraduate 
qualifications if they are only the CEO; but in duality, only 
16% (59) of the CEOs have postgraduate or professional 
qualification.
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION MODELS
This study applies multivariate regression analysis 
to test the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance. The underlying assumption is that the 
multiple regression model is used to check the multi-
collinearity based on the correlation matrix as well as the 
variance factors (Yermack, 1996; Boyd, 1995). Therefore, 
the following regression equation is proposed:
 Performance = α + β1CEO DUAL + β2Control + ∈
(1)
VARIABLES DESCRIPTION
Table 3 provides the variables description.
Performance Variables   The variables employed for firm 
profitability were Economic Value Added (EVA), Return 
on Assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q and Earnings Per Share (EPS). 
 Economic Value Added (EVA) was popularized by a 
management consultancy firm, Stern Stewart & Company. 
It is a mechanism (which is accounting-based) simplified 
as the following:
EVA = Operating Profit after tax – (Operating 
expenses – Invested Capital)  
 (2)
 Return on Assets (ROA) also known as return on 
investment, measures how a company’s assets are 
generating profits for the company, or earnings from assets. 
It is measured by dividing earnings or net income, in this 
case annual earnings or net income, of the company’s total 
assets for the same fiscal period.
 Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of 
equity and market value debt to replacement costs of firm’s 
assets. In Pakistan, as some other developing countries, 
there is no active market for debt. Khana & Palepu (1999) 
argued that using market-based indicator is inappropriate in 
emerging countries where illiquid and thin trading market 
dictate the absence of efficient capital market.
 Earnings per Share (EPS), one of the commonly 
accepted measures, is employed to determine the impact 
of independent and moderating variables. EPS measures the 
worth to shareholders on the earnings attributable to each 
ordinary share over the time; and is calculated as net profit 
divided by number of ordinary shares, multiplied by the 
percentage (Abdullah 2004; Iyengar & Zampelli 2009).
TABLE 1. Yearly Set of dual CEO sample
Year Combine Split Total
Number of Firms Percentage Number of Firms Percentage
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
14
12
15
16
16
15%
13%
16%
17%
17%
81
83
80
79
79
85%
87%
84%
83%
83%
95
95
95
95
95
TABLE 2. CEO duality characteristics
Characteristic Split Combine
Have Family Relations
Tenure with the firm
Ownership of firm equity
Postgraduate CEO
Avg. CEO Age
Female CEO
402
9 years
6.89%
301
55
7
73
12 years
2.38%
59
54
8
62 
TABLE 3. Description of Variables
Governance Variables
(A) CEO Duality (DUAL) Binary variable indicating 1 if CEO Duality, or - 0 otherwise.
Performance Variable
(B) Return on Assets (ROA) Net Profit divided by Total Assets
(C) Tobin’s Q (Q) The book value of debt plus the market value of equity, divided 
by the book value of assets.
(D) Economic Value (EVA) Added Net Operating Profit After Taxation (NOPAT)
Weighted average cost of capital (WACC)
Invested Capital (IC)
EVA = NOPAT – (WACC × IC)
(E) Earnings Per Share (EPS) Net income/weighted average of common shares outstanding.
Controll Variables
(F) Financial Leverage (FL) Total Debt/Total Equity
(G) Firm Size (FSIZE) Natural Logarithm of Total Assets
(H) Firm Age (FAGE) Total number of years the company incorporated
(I) CEO Shareholding The percentage of ownership held by the CEO in the firm.
(J) Gender Diversity Binary variable indicating 1 if female CEO, or - 0 otherwise.
(K) CEO Age The number of years of CEO age.
(L) CEO Qualification Binary variable indicating 1 if CEO holds Master degree or 
professional qualification, or - 0 otherwise.
(M) CEO Tenure The number of years of CEO affiliation with the firm.
Dependent Variable   CEO duality (DUAL) is a dummy 
variable that assumes the value one if the firm’s CEO and 
Chairman of the Board is the same person, or zero if 
otherwise (Berg & Smith 1978; Rechner & Dalton 1991; 
Boyd 1995; Frankforter et al. 2007; Henry 2009; Kim et 
al. 2009; Wang et al. 2014). Meanwhile, Lam and Lee 
(2008) observed that the separation of these rules does 
not necessarily improve a board’s monitoring capability 
if the CEO and Chairman of the Board belong to the 
same family. Therefore, following Lei and Song (2004) 
and Lam and Lee (2008) we consider CEO duality as the 
observations in which these two roles are performed by 
the same person.
Controll Variable   Ahmed et al. (2006) argued that 
financial leverage may lead to improved external control 
because creditors would monitor capital structure more 
intensively in order to protect their interests. Accordingly, 
Chen and Jaggi (2000) stated that financial leverage (FL) is 
used to measure firm leverage. CEO tenure is measured as 
the number of years that the CEO being employed by the 
firm (frankfurter et al. 2007 and Kim et al. 2009).
 CEO education has an impact on corporate performance, 
including innovation, strategic choices, and risk taking 
(Matta & Beamish 2008 and Zhang & Rajagopalan 2010). 
Thus, CEO education was also controlled in order to avoid 
influence on duality-firm performance (Ling, Simsek, 
Lubatkin, & Veiga 2008). 
 Previous empirical studies demonstrated that firm 
performance is negatively related to total assets (Lang 
& Stulz 1994). Therefore, in order to control for firm 
size, we included the variables natural logarithm of total 
assets (FSIZE). Firm age was calculated as the natural 
logarithm of the number of years from the incorporation 
of the firm, which helped to control for organization’s 
maturity (Arthurs et al. 2008 and Matta & Beamish 2008). 
The logarithmic form of analysis was applied to reduce 
heteroskedasticity (Finkelstein & D’Aveni 1994).
DATA ANALYSIS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Tables 4 and 5 depict the descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in our analysis. Table 4 segregates the data 
into Dual CEO (73 companies) and Separate CEO (402 
companies). The maximum CEO shareholding percentage 
is double in firms with dual CEO (58%) as compared to 
firms with separate CEO (30%), while the mean is more 
than double in dual CEO and separate CEO at 6.88 and 
2.39, respectively. 
 Results of descriptive statistics indicate that in 
terms of gender, 11% of combined-role companies have 
female CEOs; but in contrast, there is only 1.7% in split-
CEO companies. The average age of CEO in both types of 
companies is approximately the same, but CEO’s tenure 
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TABLE 4. Descriptive Statistics (Dual and non-dual basis)
Variables Dual CEO (N=73) Separate CEO (N=402) t-value
Min Max Mean S. D Min Max Mean S. D
CEO Duality
CEO Shareholding
Gender Diversity
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
CEO Qualification
Firm Age
Firm Size
Financial Leverage
Economic Value Added
Return on Assets (ROA)
Earnings per Share (EPS)
Tobin’s Q
0
0.00
0.0
43
1
0.0
7
6.20
0.00
0
-0.25
-25.20
0.06
0
58.00
1.0
60
24
1.0
65
8.98
3.61
1
0.35
255
5.52
0.00
6.88
0.11
54.95
12.25
0.81
33.64
7.23
0.211
0.40
0.096
21.39
1.26
0.0
15.06
0.315
3.86
5.98
0.39
18.94
0.71
0.512
0.49
0.108
52.78
1.1937
1
0.00
0.0
21
1
0
5
5.11
0.00
0
-0.88
-26.35
0.05
1
30.00
1.0
70
32
1
152
9.06
1.99
1
0.53
300.87
9.16
1.00
2.39
0.017
54.19
9.03
0.75
37.83
7.427
0.14
0.37
0.065
15.03
0.99
1.00
5.32
0.13
6.73
6.14
0.44
27.83
0.698
0.193
0.483
0.138
33.8
1.072
1.00**
8.58**
3.93**
185.7**
33.37**
38.52**
30.37**
229.3**
12.01**
16.78**
11.29**
9.34**
20.59**
TABLE 5. Descriptive Statistics of all variables
Variables Min. Max. Mean S.D.
  Governance
 CEO Duality 0 1 0.15 1.39
  Control
CEO Shareholding
Gender Diversity
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
CEO Qualification
Firm Age
Firm Size
Financial Leverage
0.00
0.0
21
1
0.0
5
5.11
0.00
58.00
1.0
70
32
1.0
152
9.06
3.61
3.076
0.032
54.31
9.52
0.758
37.19
7.397
0.148
7.813
0.175
6.375
6.221
0.429
26.683
0.703
0.268
  Performance
Economic Value Added (EVA)
Return on Assets (ROA)
Earnings per Share (EPS)
Tobin’s Q
0
-0.88
-26.35
0.05
1
0.53
300.87
9.16
0.37
0.069
16.003
1.035
0.484
0.135
37.346
1.0948
is 12 years in combined-role companies and 9 years 
in separate-role companies, which indicates that the 
person holding dual roles in Pakistan normally has long 
affiliation with the same firm.
 On the average, Dual CEO companies have qualified 
CEO (81% holding master degree) while 75% of the 
split CEO have master degree. The maximum age of firm 
for separate CEO is 152 years (that is the oldest listed 
companies in the Karachi stock exchange) instead of 65 
years of incorporation of the dual-CEO firm.
 Table 5 indicates the descriptive results for all sample 
companies. CEO duality was found in 15.4% of our sample 
(73 out of 475 firms), having family relationships taken 
into consideration. In a previous study on developing 
economy, CEO duality ratios ranged between 42% and 
25% (Andrade et al. 2008). This downward trend in CEO 
duality may indicate that Pakistani firms are progressively 
adopting the code of corporate governance.
 Of sampled firms, 37% have positive economic value 
added (EVA) and the remaining 63% represent economic 
loss. The value of Earnings per Share (EPS) is highly 
diverse; at -26.35 (minimum) to 300.87 (maximum).
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT ANALYSIS
The Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in 
Table 6. The results revealed that CEO/Chairman duality 
do not have positive association with any performance 
variables. Subsequently, Economic Value Added (EVA) is 
negatively correlated with CEO Duality. Meanwhile, the 
duality is negatively correlated with the percentage of 
CEO shareholding, female CEO, CEO’s years of affiliation 
and financial leverage; but is positively correlated with 
the firm size (FSIZE).
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REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Table 7 presents regression coefficients for the dependent 
variables of Economic Value Added (EVA). Model 1 
examines the effect of controlled variables on firm 
performance. Interestingly, EVA explained 7.7% of the 
total variance in firm performance. Results conclude that 
the higher qualification of the CEO (β= 0.007, p< 0.05) is 
positively, while firm size (β= 0.000, p< 0.05) is negatively, 
associated with the economic performance of the firm. 
The main result indicates that there is not any association 
between EVA and CEO duality.
 Table 8 presents regression coefficients for dependent 
variables of Return on Assets (ROA). Model 2 examines 
the effect of controlled variables on firm performance. ROA 
explained 9.6% of the total variance in firm performance. 
Results conclude that the higher qualification of the CEO 
(β= 0.000, p< 0.05) and CEO age (AGE) (β= 0.039, p< 0.05), 
are positively associated with the ROA; but firm size (FSIZE) 
is negatively associated with the firm performance. The 
main result also indicates that there is not any association 
between ROA and CEO duality.
 The dependent variable, Tobin’s Q (Q) and the 
regression coefficient analysis are presented in Table 
9. Model 2 examines the effect of dual leadership 
structure and controlled variables on firm performance. 
Tobin’s Q explained 19.2% of the total variance in firm 
performance. However, the results indicate that Q has a 
positive association with financial leverage, but a negative 
association with firm size. However, we did not find any 
association with CEO duality (β= 0.218, p< 0.05).
 Table 10 presents a regression coefficient analysis for 
the dependent variable, Earnings per Share (EPS). Model 2 
examines the effects of independent variable (CEO/Chair 
Duality) and controll variables on firm performance. EPS 
explained 10.3% of the total variance in firm performance. 
However, the results indicate that EPS has a positive 
association with CEO qualification, CEO affiliation with 
the firm, firm age, firm size and financial leverage; but we 
did not find any association with CEO duality (β= 0.392, 
p< 0.05).
 Table 11 presents the summary of the significant 
variables with the performance and the association of the 
TABLE 7. Results of Regression Analysis (Dependent Variable EVA)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO Shareholding
Gender Diversity
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
CEO Qualification
Firm Age
Firm Size
Financial Leverage
CEO Duality
0.735
0.207
0.994
0.396
0.007
0.752
0.000
0.195
0.754
0.212
0.988
0.412
0.007
0.751
(0.000)
0.199
0.939
0.840
0.074
0.591
0.581
0.006
0.956
0.958
(0.000)
0.229
0.919
R²
Adjusted R²
F
F for ∆R²
27.7
26.1
4.875
0.000
27.7
25.9
4.325
0.000
22.5
21.3
2.024
0.061
25.3
24.5
6.559
0.000
TABLE 8. Results of Regression Analysis (Dependent Variable ROA)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO Shareholding
Gender Diversity
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
CEO Qualification
Firm Age
Firm Size
Financial Leverage
CEO Duality
0.490
0.676
0.029
0.575
0.000
0.410
(0.000)
0.039
0.664
0.855
0.039
0.723
0.000
0.405
(0.000)
0.033
0.262
0.688
0.748
0.137
0.098
0.000
0.304
0.241
(0.000)
0.014
0.081
R²
Adjusted R²
F
F for ∆R²
19.6
18.1
6.220
0.000
19.9
18.1
5.672
0.000
15.0
13.8
4.083
0.001
16.0
15.2
7.476
0.000
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research’s main variable, CEO/Chair duality. Results in 
Table 11 generally suggest that CEO duality has no negative 
or positive effect with firm performance. These results 
are broadly consistent with the findings in other studies 
(Annuar & Shamsher 1994 and Fosberg 1989).
 In order to establish the level and direction of 
regression analysis, among the variables of interest, above 
is the Regression Analysis Matrix (Abdullah 2004). This 
matrix attempts to provide insights to the hypothesis tests 
that the study intended to test. It can be observed that we 
reject the hypothesis that there is a significant positive 
relationship between CEO Duality and performance of firms 
at the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE).
 In summary, the empirical results support the 
hypothesis that in firms where the positions of CEO and 
Chairman of the Board being held by the same person, no 
effect on their performance can be observed.
CONCLUSION
Academic research suggests that firm performance is 
associated with board leadership structures. The purpose 
of the study is to investigate the relationship between CEO 
duality and the performance of Pakistani public listed 
companies for the period of 2007 to 2011. The theoretical 
and empirical literature on corporate governance offers 
two alternative perspectives. 
 The agency theory advocates that the separation 
of the two roles is an important determinant to a 
board’s independence and effectiveness. Conversely, the 
stewardship theory postulates that firms with a unified 
leadership structure operate more efficiently through 
better coordination and unambiguous command, thus 
deal more effectively with strategic challenges. The 
leadership structure of the majority of Pakistani companies 
is characterized by the separation of roles of CEO and 
chairman.
 Our empirical findings provide clear answers to 
the emerging issue in developing countries. We find 
significant differences in firm’s characteristics between 
dual and non-dual CEO firms. However, our multivariate 
tests find no evidence that CEO duality has a significant 
effect on firm performance. Our evidence casts doubt on 
the notion that firms changing from duality to non-dual 
TABLE 9. Results of Regression Analysis (Dependent Variable Q)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO Shareholding
Gender Diversity
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
CEO Qualification
Firm Age
Firm Size
Financial Leverage
CEO Duality
0.180
0.471
0.260
0.364
0.908
0.323
(0.00)
0.000
0.116
0.649
0.214
0.267
0.969
0.319
(0.000)
0.000
0.218
0.192
0.015
0.037
0.402
0.722
0.106
0.236
(0.00)
0.000
0.437
R²
Adjusted R²
F
F for ∆R²
29.2
27.8
13.845
0.000
29.5
27.9
12.49
0.000
23.5
22.3
2.836
0.010
18.4
17.7
26.50
0.000
TABLE 10. Results of Regression Analysis (Dependent Variable EPS)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO Shareholding
Gender Diversity
CEO Age
CEO Tenure
CEO Qualification
Firm Age
Firm Size
Financial Leverage
CEO Duality
0.299
0.812
0.944
0.024
0.001
0.000
0.024
0.006
0.231
0.684
0.878
0.039
0.002
0.000
0.025
0.007
0.392
0.131
0.916
0.533
0.010
0.001
0.319
0.000
0.007
0.022
0.246
R²
Adjusted R²
F
F for ∆R²
10.3
8.7
6.674
0.000
10.4
8.7
6.010
0.000
4.7
3.5
3.827
0.001
7.3
6.5
9.251
0.000
  67
leadership structure would experience improvement in 
their performance. The above results are supported by 
prior researches on the relationship between separate 
leadership structure and firm performance. The results are 
consistent with the studies conducted by Vance (1978); 
Sullivan (1988); Rechner & Dalton (1989); Leng (2004); 
Dahya, Galguera-Garcia & Bommel (2009) and Yasser 
(2011) where they reported that duality is not significant 
to firm performance.
 According to Abdullah (2004), combined leadership 
(either single or joint) is not related to performance 
because financial ratios may not capture the board and 
leadership roles in establishing a firm’s value, but long 
term measures such as firms’ growth and their share prices 
might be useful measures. An implication for further 
research in Pakistan relates to several areas of “boundary 
conditions” of the agency, stewardship and organizational 
theories in corporate governance (Yammeesri & Herath 
2010; Yasser 2011). Multidisciplinary studies of this 
nature may contribute to a better understanding of 
what drives the effectiveness of leadership structure in 
Pakistan. For example, future work can investigate the 
specific situations and circumstances in which CEO duality 
may be beneficial to Pakistani firms. Investigating the 
factors of board’s effectiveness with multiple theoretical 
lenses may help develop more effective corporate 
governance models.
 In view that our study is a first step in many regards, 
its limitations should be noted. First, this study is based 
on KSE-100 companies from 2007 to 2011; however, a 
large sample and more recent data are required. Second, 
we focused on relatively large, publicly traded firms 
(KSE 100), suggesting that our results may not extend 
to smaller firms. Small firms tend to have lesser public 
scrutiny than large firms, indicating that accountability 
and independence play an even larger role in minimizing 
agency conflicts. Although this study focused on the role 
of CEO duality and firm performance, future researchers 
should consider panel data analysis for better results.
 CEO duality is good for some firms, while it is the 
opposite for other firms (Boyd 1995; Brickley et al. 1997; 
Elsayed 2007); a particular firm may adopt CEO duality 
under an appropriate or inappropriate organizational 
condition (Kang and Zardkoohi 2005). Likewise, it is 
too early to draw a conclusion and further study may also 
be conducted to examine the industry-specific impact 
of board leadership structure and firm performance in 
emerging economies.
REFERENCES
Andrade, L., Ashmos, P. & Duchon, D. 2008. Getting Past 
Conflict Resolution: A Complexity View of Conflict. E:CO 
10(1): 23-38.
Abdul Rahman, R. & Mohamed Ali, F.H. 2006. Board, audit 
committee, culture and earnings management: Malaysian 
evidence. Managerial Auditing Journal 21(7): 783-804.
Abdullah, S. 2004. Board Composition, CEO Duality and 
Performances Among Malaysian Listed Companies. 
Corporate Governance 4(4): 47-61.
Adams, R.B., Almeida, H. & Ferreira, D. 2005. Powerful CEOs 
and Their Impact on Corporate Performance. Review of 
Financial Studies 18(4): 1403-1432.
Albrecht, W.S. & Albrecht, C.O. 2004. Fraud and corporate 
executives. Agency, Stewardship and Broken Trust. Journal 
of Forensic Accounting 5: 109-130.
Allan, P. & Widman, A. 2000. A comparison of the views of 
CEOs and public pension funds on the corporate governance 
issues of chairman-CEO duality and election of lead directors. 
American Business Review 18(1): 49-54.
Annuar, M.N. & Shamsher, M. 1994. The Wealth Effect of 
Appointments and Resignations of Board of Directors. The 
Malaysian Management Review 29(2): 44-52.
Arslan, M., Zaman, R., Malik, K. & Mehmood, A. 2014. Impact 
of CEO Duality and Audit Committee on Firm Performance: 
TABLE 11. Statistical Test Findings
Dependent 
Variable
Variable Asymptotic Significance
Not significant Significant
EVA
CEO Qualification
Firm Size
CEO Duality 0.939
0.007
(0.000)
ROA
CEO Qualification
Firm Size
CEO Duality 0.262
0.000
(0.000)
EPS
CEO Tenure
CEO Qualification
Firm Age
Firm Size
Financial Leverage
CEO Duality 0.392
(0.039)
0.002
0.000
(0.025)
0.007
Tobin’s Q Firm Size
Financial Leverage
CEO Duality 0.218
(0.000)
0.000
68 
A Study of Oil & Gas Listed Firms of Pakistan. Research 
Journal of Finance and Accounting 5(17): 1-7.
Arthurs, D., Hoskisson, E., Busenitz, L. Johnson, A. 2008. 
Managerial Agents Watching Other Agents: Multiple Agency 
Conflicts Regarding Underpricing in IPO Firms. Academy of 
Management Journal 51(2): 277-294.
Baliga, B., Moyer, C. & Rao, S. 1996. CEO duality and Firm 
Performance: What’s the fuss? Strategic Management 
Journal 17: 41-53.
Ballinger, A. & Marcel, J. 2010. The use of an interim CEO 
during succession episodes and firm performance. Strategic 
Management Journal 31: 262-283.
Berg, S. & Smith, K. 1978. CEO board chairman. A quantitative 
study of dual versus unitary leadership. Directors and Boards 
3: 34-39.
Berrone, P. & Gómez-Mejia, L.R. 2009. Environmental 
Performance and Executive Compensation: An integrated 
agency-institutional perspective. Academy of Management 
Journal 52(1): 103-126.
Bhagat, S. & Bolton, B. 2008. Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance. Journal of Corporate Finance 14: 257-273.
Boyd, B. 1995. CEO Duality and Firm Performance: A 
Contingency Model. Strategic Management Journal 16: 
301-312.
Brickley, J., Coles, J. & Jarrell, G. 1997. Leadership structure: 
separating the CEO and chairman of the board. Journal of 
Corporate Finance 3(3): 189-220.
Cadbury Committee. 1992. The Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance. Professional Publishing Ltd: London.
Chahine, S. & Tohme, N.S. 2009. Is CEO duality always 
negative? An exploration of CEO duality and ownership 
structure in the Arab IPO context. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review 17(2): 123-141.
Charan, R. 2005. Boards That Deliver: Advancing Corporate 
Governance from Compliance to Competitive Advantage. 
San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons.
Chen, C. & Jaggi, B. 2000. Association between independent non-
executive directors, family control and financial disclosures 
in Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 
19: 285-310.
Chen, Y. & Young, M. 2009. Cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions by Chinese listed companies: A principal 
perspective. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 26.
Dahya, J., Galguera-Garcia, L. & Bommel, J. 2009. One Man 
Two Hats - What’s All the Commotion. Financial Review 
44: 179-212.
Dahya, J., Lonie, A.A. & Power, D.M. 1996. The case for 
separating, the roles of chairman and CEO: an anaylsis of 
stockmarket and accounting data. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review 4: 71-77.
Daily, C. & Dalton, D. 1993. Board of directors’ leadership 
and structure: control and performance implications. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 17(3): 65-81.
Daily, C. & Dalton, D. 1997. Separate, but not independent: 
board leadership structure in large corporations. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 5(3): 126-136.
Dalton, D. & Daily, C. & Ellstrand, A. & Johnson, J. 1998. Meta-
analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, 
and financial performance. Strategic Management Journal 
19: 269-290.
Davidson, R., Goodwin-Stewart, J. & Kent, P. 2005. Internal 
Governance Structures and Earnings Management. 
Accounting and Finance 45: 241-267.
Dedman, E. 2000. An investigation into the determinants of 
UK board structure before and after Cadbury. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 8: 133-153.
Donaldson, L. & Davis, J. 1991. Stewardship theory or agency 
theory? CEO governance and shareholder returns. Australian 
Journal of Management 16(1): 49-65.
Ehikioya, F. & Benjamin, I. 2009. Corporate governance 
structure and firm performance in developing economies: 
evidence from Nigeria. Journal of Corporate Governance 
9(3): 231-243.
Elsaid, E. & Benjamin, I. 2009. What happens to CEO 
compensation following turnover and succession? Quarterly 
Review of Economics and Finance 49(2): 424-447.
Elsaid, E., Davidson, W. & Benjamin, B.W. 2009. CEO 
compensation structure following succession: Evidence 
of optimal incentives with career concerns. The Quarterly 
Review of Economis and Finance 49(4): 1389-1409.
Elsayed, K. 2007. Does CEO Duality Eeally Affect Corporate 
Performance? Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 15(6): 1203-1214.
Faleye, O. 2007. Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial 
Entrenchment. Journal of Financial Economics 83(2): 501-
529.
Finkelstein, S. & D’Aveni, R. 1994. CEO duality as a double-
edged sword: how boards of directors balance entrenchment 
avoidance and unity of command. Academy of Management 
Journal 37(5): 1079-1108.
Forsberg, R. 1989. Outside Directors and Managerial Monitoring. 
Akron Business and Economic Review 20: 24-32.
Fosberg, R.H. 2004. Agency problems and debt financing: 
Leadership structure effects. Corporate Governance: 
International Journal of Business in Society 4(1): 31-38.
Frankforter, S., Davis, J., Vollrath, D. & Hill, V. 2007. 
Determinants of governance structure among companies: A 
test of agency theory predictions. International Journal of 
Management 24(3): 454-462.
Franks, J., Mayer, C. & Renneboog, L. 2001. Who disciplines 
management in poorly performing companies? Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 10: 209-248.
Gillan, S. 2006. Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: 
An Overview. Journal of Corporate Finance 12: 381-402.
Henry, D. 2009. Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate 
governance Compliance. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 
24-46.
Higgs Reports. 2003. Review of the Role and Effectiveness of 
Non-Executive Directors, Department of Trade and Industry, 
London.
Iyengar, R.J. & Zampelli, E.M. 2009. Self-selection, endogeneity, 
and the relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance. Strategic Management Journal 30(10): 1092-
1112.
Jackling, B. & Johl, S. 2009. Board Structure and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from India’s Top Companies. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 17(4): 
492-1112.
Judge, W. & Naoumova, I. & Koutzevol, N. 2003. Corporate 
governance and firm performance in Russia: an empirical 
study. Journal of World Business 38: 385-396.
Kang, E. & Zardkoohi, A. 2005. Board leadership structure and 
firm performance. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review 13(6): 785-799.
Kao, L.F., Chiou, J.R. & Chen, A. 2004. The Agency Problem, 
Firm Performance and Monitoring Mechanisms: The 
  69
Evidence from Collateralized Shares in Taiwan. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 12: 389-402.
Kim, B., Burns, M.L. & Prescott, J.E. 2009. The strategic role of 
the board: the impact of board structure on top management 
team strategic action capability. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 17: 728-743.
Kroll, Y., Walters, S. & Wright, E. 2008. Board Vigilance, 
Director Experience, and Corporate Outcomes. Strategic 
Management Journal 29: 363-382.
La Porta, R. & Lopez-De-Silanes, F. & Shleifer, A. & Vishny, 
R. 1998. Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy 
106: 1113-1155.
La Porta, R. & Lopez-De-Silanes, F. & Shleifer, A. 1997. Legal 
determinants of external finance. Journal of Finance 52: 
1131-1150.
Laing, D. & Weir, C.M. 1999. Governance structures, size and 
corporate performance in UK Firms. Managements Decision 
37(5): 457-464.
Lam, T. & Lee, S. 2008. CEO duality and firm performance: 
evidence from Hong Kong. Corporate Governance 8(3): 
299-316.
Lang, L., Stulz, R. 1994. Tobin’s Q, corporate diversification, 
and firm performance. Journal of Political Economy 102: 
1248-1280.
Lau, J., Sinnadurai, P. & Wright, S. 2009. Corporate governance 
and chief executice officer dismissal following poor 
performance: Australian evidence. Accounting and Finance 
49: 161-182.
Lei, A. & Song, F.M. 2004. Corporate governance and firm 
valuations: evidence from Hong Kong. Working paper, 
School of Economics and Finance, The University of Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong.
Leng, A.C.A. 2004. The impact of corporate governance practices 
on firms’ financial performance: Evidence from Malaysian 
companies. ASEAN Economic Bulletin 21(3): 308-318.
Ling, Y., Simsek, Z., Lubatkin, M.H. & Veiga, J.F. 2008. 
Transformational leadership’s role in promoting corporate 
entrepreneurship: Examining the CEO-TMT interface. 
Academy of Management Journal 51(3): 557-576.
Lorsch, J.W. & Maclver, E. 1989. Pawns or potentates: the reality 
of America’s corporate boards. Boston, Massachusetts: 
Harvard Business School Press.
Matta, E. & Beamish, P.W. 2008. The accentuated CEO career 
horizon problem: evidence from international acquisitions. 
Strategic Management Journal 29: 683-700.
Michael, B. & Anurag, S. 2007. Should the CEO also be Chair 
of the Board? An empirical examination of family-controlled 
public firms. Family Business Review 20(2): 111-126.
Peng, Zhang, & Li, 2007. CEO duality, organizational slack, 
and firm performance in China. Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management 27: 611-624.
Prowse, S. 1999. Corporate Governance: Emerging Issues and 
Lessons from East Asia. Washington: World Bank.
Rechner, P. & Dalton, D.R. 1989. The Impact of CEO as 
Board Chairperson on Corporate Performance. Academy of 
Management Executive 3(2): 141-143.
Rechner, P. & Dalton, D. 1991. CEO Duality and Organizational 
Performance: A Longitudinal Analysis. Strategic Management 
Journal 12(2): 155-160.
Rhoades, D. & Rechner, P. & Sundaramurthy, C. 2001. A 
Meta-analysis of Board Leadership Structure and Financial 
Performance: Are Two Heads Better than One? Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 9(4): 311-319.
Stewart, G.B. 1991. The Quest for Value: A Guide for Senior 
Managers, Harper Business, New York.
Stiles, P. 2001. The impact of boards on strategy: An empirical 
examination. Journal of Management Studies 38(5) 27-50.
Sullivan, W.M. 1988. Calling or career: The tensions of modern 
professional life. In A. Flores (Ed.), Professional ideals (pp. 
40-46). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Tuggle, C.S., Sirmon, D.G., Reutzel, C.R. & Bierman, L. 2010. 
Commanding board of director attention: Investigating how 
organizational performance and CEO duality affect board 
member’s attention to monitoring. Strategic Management 
Journal.
Vance, S.C. 1978. Corporate governance: assessing performance 
by boardroom attributes. Journal of Business Research 6: 
203-220.
Wang, D. & Sun, D. & Yu, X. and Zhang, Y. 2014. The impact 
of CEO duality and ownership on the relationship between 
organisational slack and firm performance in China. Systems 
Research and Behavioral Science 3(1): 94-101.
Weir, C., Laing, D. & McKnight, P. 2002. Internal and External 
Governance Mechanisms: Their Impact on the Performance 
of Large UK Companies. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting 29: 579-611.
Xie, B., Davidson, N.W. & DaDalt, P. 2003. Earnings 
Management and Corporate Governance: The Roles of 
the Board and the Audit Committee. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 9(3): 295-316.
Yammeesri, J. & Kanthi Herath, S. 2010. Board characteristics 
and corporate value: Evidence from Thailand. Corporate 
Governance 10(3).
Yasser, Q.R. 2011. Corporate governance and firm performance: 
An analysis of family and non-family controlled firms. The 
Pakistan Development Review 50(1): 47-62.
Yermack, D. 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with 
a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 
40(2): 185-211.
Zajac, E.J. & Westphal, J.D. 1994. The symbolic Management 
of CEO Compensation. Administrative Science Quarterly 
39(3): 367-390.
Zhang, Y. & Rajagopalan, N. 2010. Once an outsider, Always an 
outsider? CEO origin, strategic change, and firm performance. 
Strategic Management Journal 31(3): 334-346.
Qaiser Rafique Yasser*
House # 278, C-1,
Wapda Town
Gujranwala Pakistan
Abdullah Al Mamun
231 Sandgate Road,
Birmingham Garden
Shortland, 2287 NSW, Australia
Abdul Rahim Suriya
302, 3rd Floor,
66-C 21 Street,
Commercial Street DHA,
Phase II Extension,
Karachi, Pakistan
Corresponding author; email: qaiser_rafique@hotmail.com
